Like conduct in Georgia means misconduct on the same ground, not misconduct that seems equally bad.
The Courts Have Not Defined It Fully
OCGA 19-5-4(a)(3) bars a divorce where “[b]oth parties are guilty of like conduct,” and the statute stops there. It offers no test.
The Georgia Supreme Court conceded as much in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 222 Ga. 460 (1966). Surveying its earlier decisions, the Court noted that in each of them “both parties have charged cruel treatment which, of course, is like conduct,” then added: “What is like conduct has not otherwise been defined.”
Same Ground, Not Similar Seriousness
The clearest guidance is in Blois v. Blois, 234 Ga. 475 (1975). A wife argued that her husband’s desertion was like conduct against the cruel treatment he had charged against her. The Court refused, and its reason explains the whole doctrine: “If this were ‘like conduct’ then all four enumerated grounds for divorce would be ‘like conduct’ as to each other.”
Read that way, the bar reaches spouses who are guilty of the same thing. It does not turn two different grounds into a mutual standoff just because both are serious.
Same Ground, Different Facts
Matching the ground does not mean matching the behavior. In McCartney v. McCartney, 217 Ga. 200 (1961), each spouse charged cruel treatment arising out of the same running dispute – accusations of lying, deceit, and spying, and the failure of one spouse to love the other – with each denying what the other alleged.
That was like conduct. The Georgia Supreme Court held it was error to fail to charge the jury on the bar, and error to tell the jury it could grant a divorce to both, “since the jury could not in one breath believe both parties.”
Contact Us
This post is a quick overview of the law and is not intended as legal advice. Please feel free to contact our office for a consultation if you have questions about this or any other legal aspects regarding your case!